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A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF
DISCLOSURE, PRIVACY, AND
COMPUTERS: THE STATE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy. Disclosure. Computers. These words are red flags that
symbolize too much and are waved by many to create the fear of a totalitarian Orwellian society. Portraits of monstrous computer databases
open to all that contain society's most personal thoughts, goals, and activities swarm through our minds. Yet, it is necessary to break these assertions apart. What types of information does society expect and
desire to be confidential? In the large, complex bureaucratic society in
which we work, marry, seek medical attention, and go to schools, automated data collection is mandatory. In addition, granting access to information may serve societal purposes, such as fighting crime and
preventing drug abuse. Furthermore, does the computer really exacerbate an invasion of the personal realm by facilitating access and disclosure? Or can the computer be viewed as a mechanism which creates a
compromise between society's privacy values and disclosure needs? The
computer can make data anonymous by replacing personal identifiers
with neutral codes while making the data available to those with warranted disclosure requests.
This Note attempts to dissect these "buzz words" and to ascertain
what constitutes our society's values in privacy and disclosure. This
Note considers a survey of state court decisions which involve various
types of personal information stored in computerized databases. It is
significant that the computer dimension exists both in the background
and in the foreground. It exists in the background since all of the cases
studied involve automated data systems. Yet, it is in the foreground too,
since computers may provide the way to satisfactorily permit the coexistence of confidentiality interests and disclosure needs.
Before the analysis begins, it is important to describe the parameters of this paper. This Note assumes that the collecting actor initially
gathered the data in a legitimate manner. It does not address the hard
questions about initial collection. For example, this Note does not focus
on the First or Fourth Constitutional Amendments' protections and
prohibitions against gathering information about other people. These
important issues require independent consideration beyond the scope of
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this paper. Instead, this Note considers the dissemination problems that
arise after individuals or entities properly collect personal information
about other people. This Note examines when it is normatively acceptable to disclose legitimately obtained personal information stored in an
automated database to strangers without the subject party's consent.
This Note is divided into the following sections. The first section
will examine our values in disclosure. The second section will examine
our interests in privacy. The third section will look at how the computer dimension affects the balancing of these values. Finally, the
fourth section will suggest an approach to reduce the clash between privacy concerns and disclosure requirements in an automated society.
II.

DISCLOSURE

Disclosure is one of the many "buzz" words which permeate this
topic. The term must be dissected to determine what the courts and society really mean when they use the word disclosure. Once this amorphous term is defined sufficiently, the circumstances or uses which
normatively merit disclosure must be considered. Therefore, this section of the Note will focus on two inquiries. The first will examine the
nature of disclosure. The second will evaluate the circumstances in
which courts have considered disclosure appropriate.

A. THE COLLECTION/DISCLOSURE CONTINUUM
The question of what courts and society mean when they use the
word "disclosure" is not easy to answer. However, it is possible to view
disclosure on a continuum. At one end of this continuum lies "collection," somewhere in the middle rests "meta-collection," and at the other
end is "disclosure." In between these major data points, of course, lie
gradations. In the following paragraphs, these major data points will be
defined and examined by applying them to pertinent state cases.
It is important to note that the cases may not fit perfectly into
these nicely created categories. Some cases contain aspects of more
than one category, indicating that there is no true continuum with fine,
discrete points. A case used to illustrate one form of disclosure may be
used again to demonstrate another disclosure type. This overlap may be
an essential element of the disclosure continuum. Maybe the continuum is described more accurately as a core with concentric circles. Collection is the core, meta-collections are circles surrounding the core, and
disclosure is the outer circle. Disclosure is inclusive; it contains both
collection and meta-collection as necessary parts of its whole. However,
the fact that the cases may overlap within the continuum does not eradicate the continuum's value. The continuum illustrates the broad range
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of disclosure activity and helps to isolate the particular disclosure activities which society should sanction.
1.

Collection

Collection activity lies at one end of the continuum. Collection occurs when individuals or government entities obtain, store, and use data
for a specific, agreed upon, purpose. In its most benign form, parties
voluntarily provide the desired data about themselves to legitimate collectors. These parties approve of the collection project and consent to
the storage of information about themselves in databases. Although
there are no cases that discuss this type of activity, this is not surprising
because the parties consented to the collection and use of the
information.
Yet, there are collection situations which are somewhat more controversial. These occur when individuals or government entities collect
data for a particular purpose without a person's permission or approval.
This will often occur in the law enforcement context. A.C.L U. Foundation v. Deukmejian' is one example of such a case. In AC.L.U., the
California Attorney General's Office collected information about persons suspected of organized crime activities and stored it in a computerized database. The Attorney General's Office stated that it needed the
database to control organized crime in the state. The A.C.L.U. was concerned that police intelligence officers used the information to harass
suspects without cause. In this case, the Attorney General's Office's
creation of a data pool without the subject's consent exemplifies controversial collection activity. Although the government collected the data
for passive storage, people may not want to be subjects of the data pool.
2. Meta-Collection
Meta-collection activity occupies a space somewhere in the middle
of the continuum. Meta-collection describes the process in which individuals or government entities collect and store information for a particular purpose, but they use or release the data for an expanded
version of the same purpose or to a greater number of people than expected. Here, the problem is that the collectors use the personal information for a broader purpose within the confines of the same general
scope. A few illustrative cases follow.
Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm 2 is a good example of the
meta-collection phenomenon. In Peninsula, the state government required a local mental health clinic to create and maintain a patient
database containing the patients' medical histories and other personal
1. 32 Cal. 3d 440, 651 P.2d 822, 186 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1982).
2. 105 Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986).
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information. The state required that the local clinic store and collect
this information for accounting purposes. While the Center ostensibly
collected the data for local and state financial purposes, the Center
shared the information with federal agencies for national financial purposes. The federal government subsidized mental health clinics, including the Peninsula Counseling Center, and often requested such
information before they would grant needed funds. In both instances,
the data was to be used to satisfy accounting requirements, but the
Center expanded the exposure scope to satisfy federal requirements.
Essentially, the state clinics and federal authorities would use the data
for the same general purpose, but the Center would share the data with
more people than it originally expected when it collected the
information.
A second example is found in Koppes v. City of Waterloo3 and Davidson v. Dill.4 In these cases, the authorities arrested people for trespass and loitering violations, respectively, and placed their names in an
arrest database for processing. After the courts acquitted the parties in
both cases, the authorities wanted to retain their names in the
databases to facilitate future law enforcement. Here, the police collected the data to process the specific arrests and wanted to retain the
information for future use if the parties committed another offense.
The authorities collected the data for one purpose and wished to use it
in the future for a different, yet closely related, purpose.
While there virtually are no cases which addressed the collection
mode, the meta-collection form attracted more cases because the metacollection process is more controversial. In meta-collection, individuals
or government entities obtain data for a specified purpose and then
stretch this purpose. They either expand the circle of people who will
be exposed to the information or use the information for a slightly different, but connected, purpose. In both instances, data about people
leaks out of its controlled area. Although courts seem reluctant to forbid this leakage, possibly because the expanded scope or use is quite
similar to the original scope or use, the leaked information may concern
the subjects of the information and, often, the collectors. Meta-collection activity likely bothers people because the leaked information further diminishes the control the subjects relinquished when they
originally released the information.
3. Disclosure
Disclosure lies at the opposite end of the continuum from collection. Disclosure occurs when individuals or government entities collect
3. 445 N.W.2d 774 (Iowa 1989).
4. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972).
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data for one purpose and use or release the information for a purpose
distinct from the original goal. A plethora of the state cases cluster
around this point on the continuum. Issues of both consent and control,
slowly emerging in the meta-collection cases, are present at the disclosure stage. In disclosure cases, people consent to the release of information about themselves for a particular purpose or for use by certain
people. This consent, granting a collector restricted use of the information, gives people a sense of control over information about themselves.
People have a proprietary feeling about personal information and it is
likely that subjects will only feel good about sharing personal information when collectors ask their consent and respect their restrictions on
use. However, in disclosure cases, collectors abuse this consent and
wrest away this control by using or releasing data beyond the agreed
upon scope.
There seems to be two types of disclosure cases. The first type is
where a private party or group maintains a database and a public entity
wants to access the data. The second disclosure form is where public
entities maintain automated record systems and private parties wish to
obtain the data. The two cases which follow illustrate the former type
of disclosure.
In Doe v. Axelrod,5 the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health approved a regulation that required doctors to write
all prescriptions for benzodiazepines6 in triplicate so that pharmacists
could send a copy of each prescription to the social services department.
The social services department would store the prescriptions in a central database. The database records would contain the name and address of the patient, the name, address and phone number of the
pharmacist, the doctor's name, a substance code number, directions for
dosage, and the pharmacy file number. The social services department
created the database to monitor and prevent prescription drug abuse.
This case is an example of disclosure. The doctors and pharmacists
collected medical data from patients to treat their individual medical
problems. The government agency wants the data to aid their campaign
against prescription drug abuse. In so doing, the government intends to
monitor closely both the doctors and pharmacists, who prescribe the
drugs, and the patients, who consume the medicines. When patients obtain prescription refills, the triplicate system will report them to the authorities. The medical community obtained information for a particular
purpose and the government forces the release of the data to be used
for distinct goals. When a public entity desires to access data privately
5. 144 Misc. 2d 777, 545 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1989).
6. Benzodiazepines are tranquilizers, including Valium and Xanax.
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collected, neither the collector's nor the subject's protests likely will
prevent the disclosure.
Another example of private to public disclosure is found in In Re
Rozas Gibson Pharmacy of Eunice, Inc.7 In this case a pharmacy collected and maintained a database to monitor its Medicaid prescription
patients. The records included the patient's name, address, phone
number, physician, and prescribed medicine. The government's Medicaid Fraud Unit wanted access to the data to conduct an investigation,
since it suspected the pharmacy of Medicaid fraud activities. This case
also presents a disclosure problem. The pharmacy collected the data for
business and treatment purposes. The Medicaid Fraud Unit wanted access to the data to conduct an investigation. The two purposes are distinct. The pharmacy, a private collector, obtained personal information
for a specific purpose and the Medicaid Fraud Unit, a public entity, demands disclosure for a different use.8
The second type of disclosure case is the public to private scenario.
In these cases, the public entity, usually a government agency or department, collected data on its citizens for a certain purpose, and non-public
individuals or groups wish to access the information for a different purpose. There are many of these disclosure cases and a sampling follow.
The Catholic Bulletin Publishing Company, in Minnesota Medical
Assoc. v. Minnesota,9 requested various information from a government
database that stored publicly funded abortion records. 10 The Minnesota
Department of Public Welfare created and used the database predominantly for accounting purposes. The Publishing Company wanted access to the names of all doctors who performed these abortions, the
names of all hospitals and clinics where the physicians performed the
operations, and the amount of state funding dispersed to these physicians and providers. While the Publishing Company did not state how
they planned to use this information, it is unlikely that they intended to
use the data for accounting purposes. It is more probable that they
would use the information to further their anti-abortion campaign.
Therefore, a public entity, the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, collected the data for one purpose and the private requestor, the
7. 382 So. 2d 929 (La. 1980).
8. While the disclosure in this example does not appear to be as offensive as in the
Doe v. Axelrod scenario, it is still an example of disclosure. The Note's next section will
consider why some disclosures seem more offensive then others.
9. 274 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1978).
10. Two other state cases discuss the same factual scenario and both courts resolve
their suits as the Minnesota court did. These cases are State ex rel Stephan v. Harder, 230
Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982) and Family Life League v. Dep't of Public Aid, 112 Ill. 2d
449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986).
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Publishing Company, likely desired the data for a much different
purpose.
In Doe v. Sears," the Managing Editor of the Atlanta Constitution
requested access to the Atlanta Housing Authority's public housing
database. The Housing Authority created the database to store information about the city's public housing system. Information in the database
included the names of tenants, the number of people in the residence,
and rent payment data. The Managing Editor suspected that the Housing Authority was corrupt. He wanted to investigate the Housing Authority's practices and felt that the database records would be helpful.
Again, a public entity, the Atlanta Housing Authority, created a
database to facilitate its operations and an individual, the Managing Editor, wished to use the data for another purpose.
A third example of the public to private disclosure phenomenon is
found in IndustrialFoundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board.12 In Industrial Foundation, the Texas Accident Board
maintained a workers' compensation claims database that contained
various data on individual claimants, including the claimant's name, injury, attorney, social security number, and employer. The Board created the database to make their claims processing system more efficient.
The Industrial Foundation of the South, a non-profit corporation
formed by 282 southern companies, requested access to the employment
records. While the Foundation did not state why it wanted the information or how it intended to use the data, it is unlikely that the Foundation would use the information for claims processing purposes. More
likely, the Foundation intended to use the data to discriminate against
applicants who had filed workers' compensation claims. The Foundation would discover the identity of claimants, divulge this information
to the employers, and the employers could refuse to hire anyone with a
workers' compensation claim. Again, a government entity collected
data for one purpose and a private entity wants to access the materials
for a different use.
A final example of this common disclosure problem is found in Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University.13 In Kestenbaum, the University had a student directory in a database. The database included the
students' names, addresses and phone numbers. The University published the directory to help its freshman acclimate to the new university environment. A non-student, running for a local political office,
requested a computer tape of the data to obtain the names of potential
11. 245 Ga. 83, 263 S.E.2d 119 (1980), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 979 (1980).
12. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
13. 414 Mich. 510, 327 N.W.2d 783 (1982), off'g, 97 Mich. App. 5, 294 N.W.2d 228

(1980).
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voters. Again, a public entity created an information pool, and a private
individual desired to access this data. However, the parties had distinct
purposes for the information.
From the above discussion a description of disclosure emerges. Disclosure occurs when one individual or entity, either private or public,
collects, stores, and uses information in a database for one purpose and
a second individual or entity desires to access the data for a different
use. Since many courts hold in favor of disclosing information to requestors, the next step is to evaluate the circumstances and uses of
14
disclosure.
B. THE DISCLosuRE WEIGHT
Why do courts sanction the release of information about individuals
collected for one purpose but to be used for a distinct goal? Why do
courts permit this disclosure in certain circumstances for specific uses
and prohibit it in other situations? The answers to these questions lie
in our society's norms: the shared values held by our communities.
When a requestor wishes to access information for a use compatible
with our norms, the courts will permit the disclosure. In other instances, when the requestor's desired new use will mar the value of the
original use, the courts will prohibit disclosure. In the hardest cases, society values conflicting purposes, and the courts carefully must evaluate
both uses to discover which use carries the most normative weight.
This section attempts to analyze various cases where the courts
have considered the disclosure value. It will try to discover the normative underpinnings of these decisions and to determine whether our society should foster these norms. Four disclosure trends emerge from
the data. These patterns show that courts permit disclosure for welfare
state maintenance, law enforcement, informing the general public, and
personal gain. While it must be recognized that these categories are artificial and somewhat generalized, they can provide a loose hierarchy of
disclosure uses which can help to illuminate our society's values in
disclosure.
1.

Welfare State Maintenance

The United States is a welfare state. Although scaled back in comparison to past years, the federal and state governments have spent a
great deal of time and money on programs designed to improve society's
domestic welfare. In order to effectuate these goals and policies, the
14. A natural inquiry which springs from this analysis is to discover why disclosure is
so objectionable. Essentially, the reason why there are so many cases in this area is that
society values both disclosure and non-disclosure, and thus, a controversy arises. The nondisclosure value is discussed in a later section of this Note.
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government needs information. As a result of the size of the welfare
state's infra-structure and the number of people who consume these
benefits, state and federal governments usually create, maintain, and
store this information in huge computer databases. The government entities intend to use the data to benefit people in society by satisfying
various public needs, such as providing health care, food and shelter.
Despite the benign intent of these databases, there is potential for government to misuse the information and harm people. Public need must
be balanced against the potential for misuse to determine the disclosure
value.
One example of this welfare state value is found in the Washington
state case Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm i5 discussed above.
Briefly, this case involved the creation and maintenance of a state-wide
combined storage and tracking database to monitor the costs of publicly
funded mental health care agencies. The database contained patients'
names, dates of birth, diagnoses, and referral clinics. While the agencies
originally obtained the data for accounting and treatment purposes
within each clinic, this data was to be disclosed to all mental health
agencies in the state, as well as to federal authorities, which contributed
funding to the clinics. The court concluded that the data could be
disclosed.
The Peninsula case provides an example of the disclosure value.
The government should provide people, who are mentally ill and cannot
afford private medical attention, with an opportunity to receive treatment for their illnesses. While Washington State may want to offer
mental health services to a part of its population, it has limited resources. The database tracking system can help the state monitor its
use of funds and determine the most efficient way to use its resources.
Furthermore, the federal government conditioned its aid to Washington
on the availability of such data to ensure that the state agencies properly used the federal funds. While confidentiality concerns are present,
there also are strong disclosure interests. Disclosure will allow the
state to continue providing much needed care to a sector of its
population.
In New York's Doe v. Axelrod,l6 a second state case which examines a welfare state value, the court wrestled with the problem of prescription drug abuse. This case involved a regulation drafted by the
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health which required pharmacists to send copies of benzodiazepine prescriptions, with
patient identity and diagnosis information, to the appointed state representative for entry into a central database. The Commissioner stated
15. 105 Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986).
16. 144 Misc. 2d 777, 545 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1989).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

that the database was necessary to combat prescription drug abuse. He
claimed that doctors often either over-prescribed or privately sold these
drugs, and that young people recreationally used these drugs.
The court approved New York's prescription drug accountability
system. Here, as with Peninsula's17 mental health data, there seems to
be a strong value in permitting disclosure. Drug abuse is one of society's major maladies and it takes all forms. People are addicted to illegal drugs, over-the-counter medicines, and prescribed medications, and
disclosure may work to prevent prescribed drug addiction. Remember,
the goal of this section is to determine the weightiness of disclosure values and not to evaluate non-disclosure values. Therefore, in Axelrod's
competing non-disclosure values may outweigh the drug prevention
value, deeming the court's decision normatively incorrect.
A third set of welfare state maintenance cases concerned with child
abuse prevention is represented by the Iowa and New Hampshire cases
Roth v. Reagen l 9 and Petition of Bagley, 2° respectively. In both of these
cases, the authorities accused the parties of child abuse. They collected
and stored data about the parties in a database as part of the investigation. While an administrative officer acquitted the parties, the authorities wished to retain the parties in a child abuse offender database for
an extended period. They wanted to keep this information as an extra
safeguard to protect the children from the possibility that the administrative officer had mistakenly acquitted the parties. The court permitted the personal data to remain in the database.
While there clearly are confidentiality problems with retaining acquitted parties' names in child abuse registries, maintaining and, possibly, disclosing this data has merit. Children are victimized and
vulnerable. They often do not know they can talk to others about the
abuse, or they feel they deserve the harm. Methods which can protect
children from such harm are valuable. Information systems designed to
track potential offenders may help prevent or mitigate this type of
harm. Therefore, society may force parties cleared of child abuse accusations to suffer some stigma in order to achieve the societal goal of
child abuse prevention.
2.

Law Enforcement

In addition to welfare state goals, courts also sanction the state use
of data to satisfy law enforcement purposes. Law enforcement officials
may need access to records and the ability to maintain databases on in17.
18.
19.
20.

105
144
422
128

Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986).
Misc. 2d 777, 545 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1989).
N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1988).
N.H. 275, 513 A.2d 331 (1986).
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dividuals to ensure public safety. Although authorities may use this information to protect the public, there is a great potential for selective
discretion by authorities. Public safety should not be ensured at the
price of due process values. In the law enforcement situation, disclosure
may be valuable, but it must be monitored closely because of the great
potential for abuse. The two state cases which follow illustrate the law
enforcement value.
In In re Rozas Gibson Pharmacy of Eunice, Inc.,21 a Louisiana case
discussed above, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Louisiana Attorney General's Office conducted a fraud investigation and subpoenaed
the accused pharmacist's database. The pharmacist allegedly charged
Medicaid patients above the determined price and retained the difference. The investigators wanted the pharmacist's business records
database. In this database the pharmacist recorded various data, including the prescription type and number, the customer's name and address,
the physician, and the price. The investigators claimed that the evidence was indispensable to their case and that the pharmacist, who voluntarily became a Medicaid provider, should have expected these
regulatory investigations.
The court permitted disclosure of the data to the Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit. In this case, disclosure serves the important state goal of
assuring that its Medicaid program is administered effectively. The
Medicaid program is designed to help people who cannot afford to pay
for the medical attention they need. These people include the more
vulnerable members of society, such as the poor, the disabled, the elderly, and the very young. The accused had abused his Medicaid provider status and weakened the medical aid program. In this example,
there seems to be a good reason to permit disclosure of data.
Another set of cases, also discussed briefly above, illustrate the danger of giving too much weight to the law enforcement disclosure value.
These are the Iowa case Koppes v. City of Waterloo22 and the Colorado
case Davidson v. Dill. 23 In these cases the local authorities arrested the
plaintiffs for trespass and loitering violations, respectively, and the
courts acquitted them. The police departments wanted to retain the
plaintiffs' names in a database of arrestees to facilitate future law enforcement. The plaintiffs' wanted their names removed from the
database since the courts had acquitted them.
In both cases, the courts concluded that the law enforcement agencies could retain the acquitted parties' arrest records. Despite the
courts' findings, the disclosure value is minimal in these cases. First, a
21. 382 So. 2d 929 (La. 1980).
22. 445 N.W.2d 774 (Iowa 1989).
23. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972).
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judicial body acquitted these people of their accused crimes, and there
seems to be no viable reason why they should be stigmatized by a criminal arrest record. Second, in contrast to the child abuse cases discussed
above, the crimes in these cases do not seem to be as serious. While
trespass and loitering are criminal offenses, they are not heinous
crimes. There seems to be less value in a database maintained to protect the general public from acquitted parties who may commit similar
future offenses. Essentially, some law enforcement situations will trigger a higher disclosure value than others.
3. Informing the General Public
Another interest in disclosure which parties, the courts, and the
legislatures espouse is the public's right to know the activities of their
government. This idea is the basic premise of the federal Freedom of
Information Act ("F.O.I.A.") 24 and its offspring statutes in various
states.2 Generally, under these acts, the public is given the right to request any records or information maintained by the government, as
long as the request does not result clearly in an unwarranted invasion
of privacy. The existence of these federal and state legislative acts indicates that society values disclosure for a general purpose of informing
the populace. Essentially, this disclosure value is rooted in the American democratic tradition which grants citizens the right and responsibility to check government action. The cases exhibit much judicial
deference to the legislatures' F.O.I.A.s which permit disclosure in support of the public's "right to know."
Several cases from different states discuss the valued public's right
to know. The state courts in Minnesota,2 6 Illinois27 and Kansas28 considered whether records of publicly funded abortions may be disclosed
to the public. In all three cases, the courts decided that the computerized records could be disclosed to private interest groups after the government entity removed the patient identity information. The facts of
the Kansas case will be summarized below as representative of these
three cases.
For example, in State ex rel. Stephan v. Harder,29 the Right to Life
of Kansas, Inc. wanted to access publicly funded abortion records. The
Kansas Department of Social Welfare maintained these records in a
24. Freedom of Information Act, 5. U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Michigan's Freedom of Information Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 15231 et.
seq. and Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4.1801(1), et seq. and New York's Pub. Officers Freedom of
Information Law, Article 6 § 84 eL seq.
26. Minn.Medical Assoc. v. Minn., 274 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1978).
27. Family Life Leaque v. Dep't of Public Aid, 112 Ill. 2d 449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986).
28. State ex reL Stephen v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982).
29. Id.
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database that included the patients' names and addresses, the names
and addresses of the doctors and providers who performed the abortions, and the amount paid for the abortions. The Right to Life of Kansas, Inc., stated only that they had a right to know how the government
spends their tax dollars. They requested, pursuant to Kansas' public
records act, the names of the doctors and providers and the monetary
compensation received from performing the abortion procedures.
The Kansas court permitted disclosure of the requested data and
determined that the public had the right to know how the government
uses tax revenues. Unlike the cases previously noted, this is truly a
hard case. The legislatures have concluded that our society values public access to records of its government's activities. In this case, the requesting party wants to determine how much public money the
government spends on a certain medical procedure funded with tax dollars. The request seems to fall within the valued purview of the public
records acts. Yet, it is still troubling. While the information requested
appears innocuous, the abortion context presents a possible harmful dimension. For example, abortion services may diminish as a result of
political pressure. In addition, people may be deterred from obtaining
abortions because they fear harassment. Furthermore, women faced
with this emotionally difficult decision should not have to suffer from
additional external pressures. The legislatures designed F.O.I.A.s to ensure that a corrupt government could not hide its activities from the
populace. It is questionable whether the legislatures intended F.O.I.A.s
to be applied in contexts, such as abortion, where private groups morally oppose government acts and plan to use the official records to further their cause at the expense of harming third parties.
Doe v. Sears,3° a Georgia case discussed briefly above, demonstrates
a more valid use of the valued public's right to know. In this case, the
Managing Editor of the Atlanta Constitution requested the names, addresses, and income sources of public housing tenants from the Atlanta
Housing Authority's automated database. The editor stated that he was
investigating a charge of political corruption in the Housing Authority
and that he needed the data to confirm his investigation. He suggested
that tenants, delinquent in their rent, had special ties to the Housing
Authority and to local politicians. The editor felt that the people of Atlanta had a right to know that their government was involved in such
practices.
The Sears court permitted the disclosure of the government information, supporting a generalized disclosure value in the public's right to
know. In this case, the public's right to know is consonant with the pur30. 245 Ga. 83, 263 S.E.2d 119 (1980), cert denied and appeal dismised, 446 U.S. 979

(1980).
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poses of the public records acts. Legislatures designed the open records
systems to combat government corruption. The F.O.I.A.s decreased the
opportunities for government officials to hide behind official records. In
Sears, the Housing Authority may have engaged in such suspect activities. However, in the abortion context where the requesting party seeks
disclosure not to investigate suspicious or corrupt government behavior
but because the party disagrees morally with how government funds are
spent, the disclosure request seems less valid.
A final group of "right to know" cases premise their access requests
on the public's general right to know, but voice no reason or intended
use for the data. These cases, often based on a state's public records act,
claim that the statutes do not condition disclosure upon a person's motivations, and, therefore, requesting parties never need to establish why
they want information. While legislatures likely decided that requestors could be silent about their motivation for fear that government entities could arbitrarily refuse disclosure based on these goals, this
alternative seems equally dangerous. The arbitrary factor remains, but
now rests in the requestor instead of the requestee. It is difficult to determine whether disclosure normatively will be appropriate if the requesting party is not required to divulge the intended use of the data.
Possibly legislatures should create some inclusive list of "use" criteria
for data disclosure. Two cases which follow provide examples of the
troubling "right to know" cases.
In IndustrialFoundation of the South v. Texas IndustrialAccident
Board3 ' mentioned above, Industrial Foundation of the South, a nonprofit data collecting corporation composed of 282 companies that employed southern workers, requested access to workers' compensation information stored in the Texas Accident Board's computers. These
records included the claimant's name, injury, attorney, social security
number and employer. The Foundation did not state why it wanted the
data and the court explicitly held that the Texas Public Records Act did
not require a requestor to give reasons for a data request. In a situation
such as the Industrial Foundation scenario where the opportunity of
employment discrimination is foreseeable, it seems that the legislature
should require that requestors provide some reasons for their requests.
In Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid,3 2 an Illinois
publicly funded abortion case, the Family Life League requested the
names and addresses of doctors and providers who perform abortions,
the amount of compensation they received, and the number of abortions
performed. Although the League did not offer reasons why it wanted
the records, the court stated that the requesting parties need not ex31. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
32. 112 IM. 2d 449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986).
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plain their requests, since the public records law legitimates most requests on a generalized right to know. Again, it is hard to discern the
disclosure value when requestors do not provide reasons for their data
request. A data request based on a desire to determine if unqualified
doctors are performing abortions and hurting patients may be given a
different weight than a desire to harass doctors or their patients. If a
party declines to give a reason for a request, then the government body
should have the power to deny it. While this authority does provide an
opportunity for government entities or courts to exercise selective discretion when they analyze the reasons justifying disclosure, courts and
government bodies frequently make such value-based decisions.
4. Private Use or PersonalGain
A fourth area where state courts must determine the value of disclosure is when parties request to access data for personal use or gain as
opposed to a socially beneficial purpose. While the socially motivated
purposes for disclosure normatively appear to merit a greater disclosure
value than disclosure for personal use, courts often do not preclude individually motivated disclosure. Courts may permit disclosure for personal benefit because they wish to defer to F.O.I.A. "right to know"
precepts or because the information requested has little harm potential.
A few cases from different states illustrate these ideas.
In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,33 a Michigan case
briefly discussed above, a non-student candidate in a local election requested computerized data from Michigan State University's Freedom
of Information Officer. The candidate wanted a computer tape of the
Michigan State University Student Directory. The directory contained
the names, addresses and phone numbers of all undergraduate students
at the University. The candidate wanted the data for political mailings
he wished to send before the upcoming election. The court precluded
the disclosure.
This case is interesting because it is one of the few cases where a
court refused to permit disclosure of individuals' names and addresses
contained in public records. Generally, courts permit this type of disclosure. The courts, likely, are somewhat desensitized to disclosing name
and address data, since it is released commonly. Also, society may benefit tangentially from disclosure for use in a political campaign, since the
mailings will help to educate and involve people in the political process.
However, the requestor obtains a greater benefit from the disclosure because the mailings directly will aid his campaign efforts. While our
democratic system values stimulating involvement in the electoral sys33. 414 Mich. 510, 327 N.W.2d 783 (1982), affg, 97 Mich. App. 5, 194 N.W.2d 228
(1980).
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tem and fighting voter apathy, encouraging these values through the
disclosure of personal information without the subject's consent, at
least, should be questioned.
The following New York case involves the disclosure of assessment
data for personal gain. In the Matter of Szikszay v. Buelow,3 an individual who owned Peter's Quality Tree Service requested access to
county assessment rolls stored on computer tape at the Cattaraugus
County Real Property Tax Service. These records contained the names
and addresses of land owners. The requester needed the data for business because he wanted to locate tracts of land that might be suitable
for forest timbering.
In this case the court allowed disclosure of the assessment data.
The Szikszay case illustrates the situation where requestors would acquire individual gain from the disclosure of personal information about
other people. While it appears that disclosure serves no beneficial social
purpose in this situation, it does seem to support a societal ideal of economic autonomy. Disclosure may provide the means for people to realize their entrepreneurial dreams. Thus, in Szikszay, the disclosure
supports the development of the requestors' tree business. More significantly, disclosure of assessment-type data is less likely to harm people
than other, more personal information.
A final case provides a disclosure example where private gain and
social benefit intersect. In this type of case, courts seem more likely
to grant disclosure requests. In Stenger v. LeHigh Valley Hospital
Center,35 a recent Pennsylvania case, a woman sought access to various
automated data from a hospital and blood bank for use as evidence in
her negligence case against the hospital and the blood bank. The hospital gave the woman a blood transfusion after she was injured in an accident. A blood donor contaminated the blood with the A.I.D.S. virus and
the woman's entire family, including herself, contracted the disease.
The woman requested the identity of the blood donor, the identity of
other recipients of the donor's blood, anonymous A.I.D.S. tests results
of the recipients, and the date the blood bank delivered the blood. The
court permitted disclosure of all the requested information except for
the identity of the other recipients of the donor's blood.
In Stenger, the data requested served both private and social interests. First, the requested data would serve a private interest because it
would help the plaintiff prove her case. Yet, the value of disclosure in
this situation seems tarnished, as it was in the abortion context. The
A.I.D.S. issue is very personal. A.I.D.S. victims can be stigmatized and
ostracized if others know of their condition. The plaintiff's desire to
34. 107 Misc. 2d 886, 436 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1981).
35. 382 Pa. Super. 75, 563 A.2d 531 (1989).
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prove her case may pale in comparison. Thus, the harm to the other
donor recipients may outweigh the private benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff. Yet, on a second level, such disclosure is socially important.
A.I.D.S. is a serious disease and medical providers are in a position to
affect its transmission. The disclosure can act as a further check on the
medical community, forcing them to exercise extreme care. In addition
to a private interest in litigation, there is a strong societal disclosure
value in protecting people from this disease. In Stenger, the societal and
personal interests intersected in favor of disclosure, although the disclosure seriously could harm third parties. The court compromised and
permitted disclosure of all but the most harmful data.
C. DIsCLosuRE CONCLUDED
This section attempted to demystify the term disclosure. Its goal
was twofold. First, it attempted to define disclosure using a continuum
analogy. Disclosure was placed on the continuum along with the collection and meta-collection concepts. Second, this section tried to ascertain
why society values disclosure and how society should weight these disclosure values. This section investigated these disclosure values
through a survey of uses and circumstances.
Four disclosure values emerge from the data. They include interests in disclosure for welfare state maintenance, for law enforcement
needs, for a general public "right to know," and for personal use or private gain. If these interests were plotted along a continuum, where the
left side represented a high disclosure value and the right side represented a low disclosure value, then the four values would lie on the
scale in the order listed above. When the requestor intends to use the
requested data for a beneficial social program designed to help individuals or groups, such as a crime or drug prevention program, then the disclosure interest seems high. Law enforcement purposes also rate high
on the scale, but the potential for selective enforcement abuses taint
this public safety interest. The public's "right to know" is important
both because it is derived legislatively and because of its traditional
democratic rationale. Yet, the "right to know" may permit indiscriminate disclosure. Finally, disclosure for private gain is the least valued
simply because it benefits only the requestor. However, it should be
recognized that these groups do not represent static categories. They
are general categorizations that help to form an analytical scheme. It is
possible to have a case that falls into the personal benefit category, but
its effect is to benefit society generally which may give it an increased
weight. The Stenger case above is an example of this type of case.
Finally, it should be emphasized that giving disclosure a high or low
weight often will not determine whether a requestor will receive the
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personal data. The disclosure value must also be weighed against the
non-disclosure value. Assigning the disclosure weight is a threshold
consideration; it indicates how much weight to place on the disclosure
side of the scale. Yet, it is possible that when the scales are weighted, a
low valued disclosure interest will outweigh a lower valued non-disclosure concern. The next section considers society's values in nondisclosure.
III.

PRIVACY

Privacy is the "buzz" word of "buzz" words. It is used to mean anything and everything. The privacy concept is most often coupled with a
cry of invasion, and this cry has grown louder with the advent of the
computer age. It is essential to ascertain what courts and people mean
when they wave the privacy right flag. This section attempts to dissect
this amorphous, expansive value.
A.

THE STATE CASES: A NORMATIVE GRADATION OF WRONG

This section focusses on two inquiries. The first inquiry examines
the records to determine the characteristics of the personal information
which caused the invasion claims. Once the reason for the invasive feeling is pinpointed, the second inquiry ranks the harm that resulted from
the perceived invasion. The harm is scaled according to a normative
gradation of wrong. 36 On the least offensive end of the continuum is
"hurt," which can occur when the automated database works to obstruct
one's interests or goals. One is still able to achieve one's interests or
goals but the means are made much more difficult. In the middle of the
harm scale lies "harm," which results when the computerized information disables one's ability to achieve one's interests or goals. Here, essentially, one can no longer achieve the things one wants. On the most
offensive end of the scale exists "the purely bad thing," where the collection, storage, and use of the data violates a sense of our moral norms.
The wrong is the invasion itself, regardless of the existence of any
harm. This Note does not present the normative gradation of wrong
analysis as the way to sort out the privacy mess. Instead, it is hoped
that this analysis partially will illuminate a very clouded subject. The
cases follow.
1.

Sexuality
In Planned Parenthoodv. Van de Kamp,37 the California Attorney

36. Please note that this idea of ranking and the particular termination evolved from
extensive discussions with Ronald R. Garet, Professor of Law and Religion, University of
Southern California Law Center.
37. 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1986).
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General and Alameda County District Attorney interpreted a state
child abuse prevention law. Their interpretation required physicians
and mental health professionals to report minor patients who engaged
in sexual activities with other minors. They broadly read this law to include consensual sexual activity between minors within its expanded
scope. The authorities would retain the identity of these youth "offenders" in a central database which would enable them to track the minors
and prevent future violations. Planned Parenthood, physicians and
other mental health professionals objected to the broad reading of the
law. They felt that the legislature enacted the law to prevent child
abuse and not to scrutinize normal social and sexual adolescent
development.
Allowing authorities to track sexual activity between consenting
adolescents seems wrong. Part of the reason may be that sexuality is
one of many dimensions which comprise a person's core being. Sexuality helps shape a person's self-perception and contributes to the making
of a complete human being. Most significantly, beginning sexual exploration may have a sharp effect on the individual development process.
The first exposures to human sexual experiences determinatively can
shape a person's feelings about his or herself. Since sexuality is so central to one's sense of self, people want their sexual experiences and
practices free from outer view or control, unless they give their informed consent.
The California database ranks as a "purely bad thing." It violates a
moral norm. One's sexuality is core and should remain inviolate. Our
society should value healthy, well-adjusted people. A database which
tracks the sexual activity of society's young people at the most crucial
stage of their self discovery seems counter to these ideals. Therefore, a
database that monitors sexual development is intrinsically offensive.
Whether or not adolescents suffer harm as a result, it is a "purely bad
thing."
2. Emotional Health
There are a number of cases in which parties objected to the computerized database because it posed the threat of emotional harm. In
Webb v. City of Shreveport,a a Louisiana labor union organizer requested access to Shreveport's municipal employee personnel database
so that he could organize the employees into a union. Hinderliter v.
Humphries, 9 a Virginia case, involved a city council member's inappropriate release of a policeman's employment record. The policeman arrested the member's daughter, and the member, intending to bring
38. 371 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 1979), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 (La. 1979).
39. 224 Va. 439, 297 S.E.2d 684 (1982).
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brutality charges against the policeman, wanted to use the personnel
file as leverage. In Mullin v. DetroitPolice Department,4° a person calling himself a traffic researcher requested access to the police department's traffic accident database. The data-base included information
about parties involved in accidents and about the police officers, present
at the scene of the accident. In each of these cases, the parties objected
to the request for data. The objectors claimed that the subjects of the
records could suffer emotional harm from embarrassment or reputational damage if the requestor used or purviewed the records.
The parties' claims to prevent emotional harm appear viable. A
tarnished reputation, ridicule, and embarrassment threaten a person's
self-esteem and confidence. Feeling good about, and being proud of,
one's self is part of being a complete, functional human being, and,
therefore, society should place a high value on people's emotional
health. When third parties access data which has the potential to damage self-perception, the risk is great that emotional harm may occur.
This emotional harm seems to fit into the crippling "harm" category. Yet, it is harder to rank on the normative wrong scale than the
sexuality example discussed above. Emotional harm seems to merit
placement in the higher valued harm category because society should
not sanction the damaging of people's emotional well-being. Self-esteem and confidence are good feelings for people to have about themselves. However, emotional harm does not merit placement in the
"purely bad thing" category. First, a "purely bad thing" exists whether
or not there is harm. Here, the triggering point is the emotional harm.
Second, there are circumstances when such harm, although not intentional, will be a necessary by-product. For example, if a policeman brutally arrested a person, then a disclosure of his personnel file may be
necessary to evaluate the arrest. In contrast, there are no circumstances when a "purely bad thing" normatively would be acceptable.
Therefore, emotional harm may fall under the "harm" category on the
gradation scale. Such harm can be disabling. As a result of such information being divulged, a person can feel so poorly about herself that
she may not be able to hold a job or maintain relationships. The emotional harm threat fits best in the debilitating "harm" category.
3.

Employment Discrimination

In Industrial Foundationof the South v. Texas Accident Board,41 a
non-profit corporation, composed of 282 employers in the south, requested the use of the Texas Accident Board's workers' compensation
database. This database contained various information about workers'
40. 133 Mich. App. 40, 348 N.W.2d 708 (1984).
41. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, (1977).
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compensation claimants, including the claimant's name, injury, social
security number, employer and attorney. The Accident Board did not
want to release the information because it feared that the Foundation
would use the data for discriminatory purposes. Essentially, the Foundation likely would release the information to bar workers, who had
made injury claims, from employment in many southern companies.
A few cases,4 described in detail in previous sections of this Note,
dealt tangentially with discrimination. These cases' factual scenarios involved parties acquitted of trespass and loitering crimes and cleared of
child abuse accusations. In these cases, although the judicial or administrative bodies cleared the parties of all wrongdoing, the authorities
wished to maintain information about the parties in a central database
for future law enforcement needs. The acquitted people objected to
their names remaining in the databases for several reasons, including
the belief that employers could obtain the information and deny them
employment opportunities.
The Board's and the cleared plaintiffs' concerns have merit. The
cases above present situations ripe for such unfair activity. The data, be
it a workers' compensation claim or an acquittal record, can be used by
employers to discriminate. If discrimination is permitted, then a chilling effect can occur. For example, as a result of the Texas case, workers may opt not to report their serious injuries for fear that they could
lose work opportunities. In addition to the individual worker having to
suffer serious injury without compensation, the employer will have little incentive to remedy the unreported dangerous situation which may
result in harm to others. Our society should not support discriminatory
employment practices because people should have the equal opportunity to obtain work. Work is an essential part of peoples' lives. It is
necessary to work to earn the means for food, shelter, medical care, and
for the non-necessities that enrich one's life. More significantly, work
can provide emotional sustenance. People often get much pleasure and
self-fulfillment from their occupations. Our society should discourage
employment practices which discriminate.
Employment discrimination is a serious wrong. On one hand, discrimination seems to merit placement as a "purely bad thing." Whether
or not a person is actually harmed by discrimination is irrelevant. Our
society should not permit the unfair and unequal treatment of people
because they are of different races, genders or physical makeup. Yet,
while work is core to our lives, it does not seem to be as essential as
sexuality and emotional well-being. It seems that one can be fulfilled
42. Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 513 A.2d 331 (1986); Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo.
123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Roth v. Reagen, 422 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1988); Koppes v. City of
Waterloo, 445 N.W. 2d 774 (Iowa 1989).
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and whole, despite discrimination in the workplace. Nevertheless, discrimination is inherently wrong, and our society should not practice or
permit discrimination, irrespective of whether it causes harm. While
our society may consider employment to be less fundamental than sexuality or emotional health, discrimination in the workplace can make
people feel bad about themselves and directly impact their emotional
and sexual well-being. The non-discrimination value may approach the
"purely bad thing" data point on the normative gradation of wrong.
4. Identifiers: Name and Address
Many of the state cases involved name and address databases.'
The factual scenario in Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University" is
representative of this group of cases. In Kestenbaum, a political candidate in the local election requested access to the University's student directory database. The candidate wanted to use the names, addresses
and phone numbers in the database to expand his electoral mail

campaign.
There are at least two arguments that explain why people consider
identifier data, i.e., name, address and phone number, inviolate. First,
our names, and our addresses to a degree, are a significant part of ourselves. People have a certain proprietary feeling about their names.
Although on a more superficial level, our names are a part of us. For
example, when we meet people, we often describe ourselves by using
our names and where we live. We recognize others by their names
which helps us to communicate. Also, while we freely give others this
identifier data, we prefer to do the giving. We are bothered when we
find junk mail in our mailboxes or receive a phone call from a
telemarketing agent as a result of being on a mailing list. People would
prefer to decide when others can receive their personal information.
The second argument, set forth by the Kestenbaum court, is that
address and telephone data function as conduits for potential intrusion
in to the home. Constitutional jurisprudence gives the home special significance. 4 5 The courts consider the home to be an intrusion free zone,
since it is within the home environment that people develop their most
personal relationships with spouse, family, and friends. Names and addresses are invitations to intrude into the sacred home realm.
43. See, Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371 So. 2d 316 (La. 1979), writ denied, 374 So. 2d
657 (La. 1979); Mich. State Employees Assoc. v. Dep't of Management & Budget, 428 Mich.
104, 404 N.W.2d 606, aff'g, 135 Mich. App. 248, 353 N.W.2d 496 (1984); Matter of Szikszay
v. Buelow, 107 Misc. 2d 886, 436 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1981).
44. 414 Mich. 510, 327 N.W.2d 783, aff'g, 97 Mich. App. 5, 294 N.W.2d 228 (1980). Note
that this case is unique as the court in Kestenbaum held that the name, address, and telephone data should be protected from disclosure.
45. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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It is questionable whether this data category even should lie on the
normative gradation of wrong. Name and address data is so common
that virtually it is impossible to view its use as a "purely bad thing"
which violates a moral norm. Also, such data use does not seem to disable the subject person, as the "harm" range suggests. It is even difficult to consider identifier data as a "hurt," obstructing an interest or a
goal. Yet, the parties could argue that the release of identifier data obstructs one's control over access to both one's self and one's home. If
identifier data belongs on the continuum at all, then its place is on the
farthest edge of the normative gradation wrong's "hurt" range.
5. Medical History and Records
There are a cluster of cases which discuss medical histories and
records. In Doe v. Axelrod,46 described in greater detail above, the New
York Health Department wanted to create a database composed of personal data records from patients who used prescription benzodiazepines
for mental health treatment. The public database would include the
person's name, diagnosis, and doctor. In Peninsula Health Care v.
Rahm,47 also described above, the Washington State Health Department
wanted to design and maintain a database of all people who sought therapy from publicly funded mental health clinics. Again, the data would
have included a person's name, diagnosis and clinic. The information
would have been available to all state social services departments and to
pertinent federal agencies. In Pennsylvania's Stenger v. LeHigh Valley
Hospital Center,48 a woman who had received an A.I.D.S. contaminated
blood transfusion wanted the blood donor's identity disclosed and access
to all other donor recipients' records. Finally, in Illinois' Family Life
League v. Departmentof Public Aid,4 9 a private group wanted access to
data on publicly funded abortions without patient identifiers. In all
four of these cases, people opposed the disclosure of the medical data.
There is no easy answer to the question of why people wish to prevent the release of medical data about themselves. In the cases involving mental health and A.I.D.S., the desire for confidentiality may rest in
a fear of prejudice. People suffering from mental illness or diseases like
A.I.D.S. are often socially and emotionally ostracized. Therefore, people may wish to keep their records out of public view to protect themselves from discrimination or ridicule. In the abortion context, in
addition to stigma, women are faced with a morally difficult decision. It
seems wrong that other people should be allowed to contribute to the
46.
47.
48.
49.

144
105
386
112

Misc. 2d 777, 545 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1989).
Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986).
Pa. Super. 574, 563 A.2d 531 (1989).
111. 2d 449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986).
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emotional pam an individual suffers when groping with the complex
choice of whether to have an abortion.
While data collection and release in the medical context is not a
"purely bad thing," it likely ranks in the "harm" portion of the normative gradation continuum. It should not be characterized as a "purely
bad thing" because there are circumstances that mandate such data collection and release. However, medical information disclosure significantly can impact a person's core being. There is a potential for great
harm to both emotional and physical well-being. Ostracism, as a result
of illness, can damage one's self-perception and it should be an individual's exclusive decision whether or not to undergo a certain medical
procedures. In addition to mental and bodily integrity, there is the possibility of a serious chilling effect: Ill people may not seek the treatment they need for fear of ridicule or ostracism. Medical data
disclosure ranks on the "harm" range in the normative gradation of
wrong.
C.

PRIVACY CONCLUDED

The state cases reiterate that the privacy value is complex and
amorphous. The cases indicate that privacy is a conglomeration of various interests inextricably linked to one's sense of self. Some of the areas deemed private in cases, such as sexuality, emotional well-being,
physical health, employment opportunity, and personal identifiers, represent attributes which make people complete human beings. Some of
these interests are core, such as sexuality, and some are more peripheral, such as personal identifiers. Yet, all of these values seem to add
up to what "me" means and each individual should be sovereign over
this "me."
The state cases show how people fear that data collection, storage
and use will harm their "me" or sense of self. In an attempt to evaluate this fear, this section analyzed various privacy values, such as sexuality and emotional well-being, in light of the potential harm caused by
disclosure. The various values and their disclosure harms were ranked
on the normative gradation of wrong scale; the scale consists of "hurt,"
"harm" and "purely bad thing" data points. The normatively weighted
scale will help to determine when disclosure of a certain type of data
should be allowed.
IV.

THE COMPUTER DIMENSION

A. INTRODUCTION
The computer has both a passive and an active role in the disclosure/privacy dilemma. In its passive role the automated database is in
the background; the cases included in this study all involved informa-
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tion stored or to be stored in computerized databases. In some cases,
parties wanted to access data maintained in computers or to create new
databases. In other cases, people protested the existence of databases
and wanted the courts to deny others access to the data.
However, the computer has a greater role than that of a backdrop
for the disclosure/privacy conflict. While the computer did not create
the tension between privacy and disclosure, it has exacerbated this preexisting tension. First, the computer has increased people's access to information. By collecting, organizing and storing the data in a central
repository, it is easier for people to obtain and use the data. Second, the
volume of information available to the public is greater. The automated
database has storage capacities that enormously exceed manual file storage. Computer disc drives can hold amounts of information equivalent
to university libraries. Third, the computer has made it meaningfully
and efficiently possible to combine voluminous groups of information.
Computer matching permits the creation of profiles on individuals gathered from various databases. The disclosure problems and privacy concerns existed before the advent of computers, but the computer
exacerbates these preexisting problems. Orwellian rhetoric abounds in
all the cases and grows more shrill in the more recent judicial opinions.

B. THE STATE CASES
The state courts display varied responses to the impact of the computer on the privacy/disclosure dilemma. Some courts recognize the
heightened dimension added by the automatic database. Other courts
seem to ignore the computer aspect altogether or discount the computers impact on the conflict. A few of the cases and a brief discussion
follow.
1.

The Computer'sSignjiicant Invasive Impact

Many state courts have recognized the exacerbating effect that the
computer may have on our society's conflict between its disclosure and
privacy values. In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,5° discussed in detail above, an election candidate desired access to a university computer tape that contained all of the students' names and
addresses for his election campaign. In addition to denying his request,
the court commented on the impact of the computer. The court stated
that the "form" of data storage motivates the invasion. It felt that computers made more information available, readily accessible, and easily
manipulable. The court concluded that the judicial system had a duty
to be increasingly vigilant in its protection of individual rights as a re50. 414 Mich. 510, 327 N.W.2d 783 (1982), affg, 97 Mich. App. 5, 294 N.W.2d 228
(1980).
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suit of the intrusive computer. In Mullin v. Detroit Police Department,5 ' also described above, a private researcher wanted to access
individual traffic records. The court did not permit the disclosure and
claimed that the computer and its matching capability had increased
the risk of privacy invasion. Like the Kestenbaum court, the Mullin
court declared that the efficiency of the computer motivated intrusion
in to individuals' personal lives.
The court in Spargo v. New York 5 2 permitted disclosure of a criminal investigation file. The New York State Commission on Government
Integrity and the New York State Board of Elections needed the file to
continue their investigation of illegal state campaign financing. The
subject of the file, a key participant in the illegal scheme, claimed that
the entities should not have access to the file since it would invade his
personal privacy and violate New York's Personal Privacy Protection
Law.5 The court disagreed with the petitioner and expressly held that
the law was enacted to protect against dangers to privacy posed by computerized intrusion into automated databases. Here, the requested file
was a manually accessed paper record. Therefore, the court declared
that the statute was inapplicable. The Spargo case is interesting because it indicates that the New York legislature may perceive a potential for increased harm from information stored in a computerized
manner.
Finally, a series of cases generally refer to the perceived greater intrusion resulting from storage of data in computers. In Petition of Bagley, 54 a child abuse case discussed in more detail above, the court did
not permit disclosure because of a distinct due process violation. However, the court did comment on the impact of automated databases and
stated that although the records were to be kept confidential, the central registry posed the problem of an increased invasion of privacy. In
Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles,ss the California Supreme
Court prohibited the California Department of Motor Vehicles from
disseminating information from a computerized fingerprint file to third
parties for uses unrelated to motor vehicle safety. The court emphasized that the computer instrumentally had increased the risk of privacy invasions. Finally, in IndustrialFoundationof the South v. Texas
IndustrialAccident Board,m a workers' compensation case discussed in
several sections above, the court noted that an automated records
51. 133 Mich. App. 46, 34 N.W.2d 708 (1984).
52. 140 A.D.2d 26, 531 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1988), appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 809, 531 N.E.2d
299, 534 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1988).
53. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 91 (Consol. 1990).
54. 128 N.H. 275, 513 A.2d 331 (1986).
55. 42 Cal. 3d 185, 721 P.2d 50, 228 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1986).
56. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 931, (1977).
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database with a direct tie-in improved efficiency. However, the court
also recognized that the efficiency heightened the likelihood of intrusion into an individual's personal affairs. All of these cases, and others
not listed,57 suggest that the evolution of computerized technology has
either threatened to decrease or actually diminished the scope of peoples' personal realms.
2.

The Computer has an InsignificantImpact

Despite the multitude of cases which lament the decrease in individual privacy from automated databases, some courts have held that
the computer has a negligible effect on privacy and disclosure problems.
In the Ohio case State v. Andrews,Ms the court permitted the disclosure
of drivers' license abstracts and offense data for persons who had committed multiple offenses. The Beacon Journal Publishing Company requested the data without stating why it wanted the information. The
Journal merely mentioned the F.O.I.A. as its reason for obtaining the
information. The Director of the State Motor Vehicle Department objected to the request on several grounds including the privacy of driving
citizens, the existence of other information in the database and the cost
of retrieval. The court considered the Director's Orwellian fears to be
an invalid basis for retaining the information. It held that the mere
storage of information in a computer should not become an excuse for
non-disclosure. Furthermore, the court stated that a computer should
not be used to make data unattainable.
In Michigan State Employees Association (M.S.E.A.) v. Department
of Management and Budget,59 discussed in detail above, the Association
wanted to access the names and addresses of all state civil service employees. The Association wanted to mail organizational and informational material to inform employees of their labor rights. The
Department protested the request on privacy grounds, but the court
permitted the disclosure. The court dismissed the issue that the records
were stored on a computer tape. It stated that the fact that the information is contained in computer form does not alter the presumption in
favor of disclosure.
Two final cases briefly echo the views of the Andrews' and Michigan Employees' courts. In Minnesota Medical Association v. Minnesota,6° a case involving records of publicly funded abortions described in
previous sections, the court stated that there was no need for special
57. Family Life League v. Dep't of Public Aid, 112 Ill. 2d 449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986);
State v. Nixten, Nos. 86AP-139, 86AP-140 (Ohio App. filed Aug. 19, 1986).
58. No. 75AP-418 (Ohio App. filed Jan. 15, 1976).
59. 428 Mich. 104, 404 N.W.2d 606, aff,'g 135 Mich. App. 248, 353 N.W.2d 496 (1984).
60. 274 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1978).
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rules to safeguard privacy merely because records were stored in computers. Also, in Matter of Szikszay v. Buelow,6l a New York assessment
data case detailed above, the court denied the Cattaraugus County Real
Property Tax Service's request to prevent disclosure. The court declared that the computer form did not alter the public's right to official
information. This set of cases diametrically opposes the views espoused
by the courts in the previous section. Here, the courts seem to view the
Orwellian cry of the computer as a mere ruse to restrict the flow of information to the public.

C. THE COMPUTER AS A SOLUTION TO THE DIsCLosuRE/PIvAcY
CONFUCT

The previous discussion indicates that the computer dimension has
further complicated the disclosure/privacy dilemma. In addition, to
courts weighing the respective values of disclosure and privacy, the
courts now must contend with the impact that the computer has on the
conflict. Some courts view the impact as greater than others, but most
courts, at least, do examine the computer effect. Despite the courts' debate surrounding the computer's actual impact on the privacy/disclosure conflict, it is possible to view the computer as providing a partial
solution to the privacy/disclosure problem. Computers have the technical capability to mask identifiers and to make their records anonymous.
People and entities can access records for various purposes without connecting the record to a real person. Subjects of such access are less
likely to be concerned about disclosure or privacy. If the people cannot
be identified, they should not care if the collector obtained data for one
purpose and used it for another. There is little chance that a person's
private realm or sense of self will be impacted upon if there is no identifier in the record. Many courts have championed the computer's anonymity capability as a solution to the disclosure/privacy problem. A
few of these cases follow.
In Webb v. City of Shreveport,62 a labor union organizer requested
data about city employees to aid his attempt to organize a union. The
city denied the request. It dually claimed that the records contained information which potentially could humiliate and embarrass the employees and that the employees furnished the data for limited purposes.
The court permitted the disclosure. The court stated that as a result of
the computerized nature of the records, the city easily could extract
only the names and addresses of the employees for the labor organizer's
use. Also, in Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated School Dis61. 107 Misc. 2d 886, 436 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1981).
62. 371 So. 2d 316 (La. App.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 (La. 1979).
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the Illinois court permitted disclosure of standardized test
scores, identified by race, to parents with children in the District's
schools, but who were unrelated to the student test takers. The court
denied the Evanston Community Consolidated School District's attempt
to prohibit release of the data. The court stated that since the information was computerized, it was easy and safe to redact the identifying information to comply with the parents' request. In addition, the
Washington court in PeninsulaCounseling Center v. Rahm,6 a case discussed in detail above, permitted disclosure of public mental patient
data to various government entities. The court felt that the automated
records could be treated by encoding identifiers, which would remove
any personal connection to the data. Other cases in Illinois5 and Kansas66 echo these courts' solutions.
However, the computer's ability to segregate identifier information
will not resolve the disclosure/privacy conflict in all situations. Under
certain circumstances anonymity will not suffice. The Colorado court,
67
in Sargent School District Number RE 33 v. Western Services, Inc.
denied a non-profit group's attempt to obtain students' CTBS test
scores. The group offered to replace the name record with an ethnic
code and randomly to arrange the scores. The court stated that merely
because the data can be parsed and manipulated does not necessarily
compel access to the exempted information. In situations where
"purely bad things'ss are at issue, the removal of identifiers is insufficient. There are some areas so essential to self-definition that related
information should not be disclosed, or sometimes, even collected. Data
on sexuality, abortion, A.I.D.S., or data used to discriminate against people, discussed in the Privacy section above, are examples of core information. Essentially, computerized databases only partially resolve the
disclosure/privacy conflict. Where merely eradicating identifier information will satisfy peoples' concerns about automated databases, the
computer may be a viable solution to the conflict.
trict,,

V.

AN APPROACH TO THE DISCLOSURE/PRIVACY CONFLICT

This Note attempted to demystify the disclosure/privacy conflict in
the automated data scenario. In so doing, it discovered that our society
values both disclosure and privacy in distinct contexts. The Note's next
63. 128 111. 2d 373, 538 N.E.2d 557 (1989).
64. 105 Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986).
65. Family Life League v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 112 Ill. 2d 449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986);
Hamer v. Lentz, 171 111. App. 3d 888, 525 N.E.2d 1045 (1988).
66. State ex reL Stephan v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982).
67. 751 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1988).
68. For this Note's definition of a "purely bad thing" please see above section on
Privacy.
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goal is to propose a way for adjudicators to consider cases where disclosure values clash with privacy values. This section does not promise to
provide the answer to this complex problem. Instead, it provides an approach to the disclosure/privacy dilemma.
A.

AN APPROACH

A mechanistic model will not offer the best method for solving the
disclosure/privacy problem. No equation type analysis with fungible
variables that would provide an answer in each circumstance would be
viable. Furthermore, a voluminous list of "If this .... then that . . ."
postulates also are not very useful. The disclosure/privacy dilemma involves norms. Cultural values meaningfully cannot be plugged into
mechanical formulae. Norms demand individual discretion of themselves and the circumstances, especially when competing norms exist.
Therefore, courts must use something other than a mathematical-type
equation to solve these problems.
A normative case-by-case analysis may be the most useful tool for
resolving the disclosure/privacy conflict. This analysis could be guided
by a three step inquiry. First, the adjudicator could consider the disclosure value. The adjudicator could determine what type of disclosure
was challenged, i.e., collection, meta-collection, or disclosure, and then
ascertain the societal value placed upon the use of the requested information. Second, the adjudicator could evaluate the privacy value at
stake. For example, he or she would ask whether the value involved a
"purely bad thing," that no disclosure value could challenge, or a
"hurt," that could be subordinated to disclosure when society deemed
disclosure more valuable. Third, the adjudicator could try to resolve
the conflict with the advantages of the computer. The computer's
processing abilities can redact identifiers and remove the privacy concern altogether to satisfy society's interest in disclosure. Finally, if the
computer does not provide a solution to the conflict, then the adjudicator would balance the two valued norms in each circumstance and determine whether the privacy or the disclosure value should take
precedence.
This normative case-by-case approach is not without its drawbacks.
As with any normative evaluation, adjudicators are given much discretion to shape and select our society's norms. It is quite possible that
courts could be arbitrary in their normative disclosure/privacy evaluation. Furthermore, there is little accountability for such decisions.
While some states periodically hold popular elections of adjudicators,
other states place full responsibility for accountability within the appellate system. A type of cultural/normative tyranny can be envisioned.
However, fear of a cultural/normative tyranny may be unrealistic.
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First, a case-by-case approach demands careful scrutiny of the facts and
circumstances of each case. Because each case requires its own analysis,
an adjudicator's systematic arbitrariness may be hindered. Second, the
state legislatures can serve to check the courts' discretion. If courts' decisions resolve the disclosure/privacy conflict in a manner that is
counter to society's accepted norms, then the elected representatives
may enact legislation to embody the desired values and eradicate the erroneous decision's effect.
Third, and more significantly, it is foolish to believe that our courts
adjudicate in a normative vacuum. Courts are made up of individuals
shaped by our society's values. Their decisions necessarily incorporate
these cultural and normative beliefs. Also, the law is rooted in our society's norms. "Policy" determines the rule structure assumed by our
laws, and this "policy" is composed of norms. For example, our laws
more stringently punish first degree murder than manslaughter, because our norms dictate that an intent to kill another human being deserves more punishment than a killing without such scienter or
recklessness.
Despite the various criticisms, a normative, case-by-case analysis
guided by inquiry steps may be the most honest and effective approach
for adjudicators to employ when they encounter the disclosure/privacy
dilemma in automated data cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Note provided a normative examination of when entities or individuals, who legally collected and stored personal information in a
computer, can distribute this personal information to others without the
subject party's consent. First, this Note discussed society's values in the
disclosure of information to others. For this purpose, this Note dissected the term disclosure into three components: collection, meta-collection, and disclosure. Society's concern about disclosure was great
when the activity was a "disclosure activity," i.e., the collector obtained
the information for one purpose and used it for a conflicting purpose.
The second section of this Note examined society's values in the amorphous idea of privacy. A normative gradation of harm was developed,
consisting of a continuum with "purely bad thing," "harm" and "hurt"
data regions. The concern for privacy was greatest when the collected
data involved a "purely bad thing." Outside of the "purely bad thing"
realm, compromises to satisfy significant disclosure values would be
permissible under certain circumstances. The third part of this Note
considered the computer dimension of the privacy/disclosure dilemma.
Some courts viewed the computer as a frightful Orwellian invader of
the personal realm while other courts felt that the computer had no im-
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pact. Yet, most significantly, the computer may provide a partial solution to the dilemma. The computer can satisfy disclosure needs by
offering access to information, while simultaneously allaying privacy
concerns by masking the subject's identity with symbolic identifiers.
The computer is a viable solution for all but the "purely bad thing" privacy category, which demands that no information of this type even be
collected. Finally, this Note provides a model for adjudicators grappling
with the privacy/disclosure dilemma. The model set forth is a balancing
model guided by society's shared normative values.
The privacy/disclosure dilemma in the computer context is complex because of its normative character. Society has strong and valid
values in both privacy and disclosure interests. While the computer
may provide a partial solution to the problem, the conflicting values
may provide problems that the computer's anonymity tools cannot
solve. Each distinct fact situation may demand a unique result. Sometimes the disclosure values will be more significant than the privacy
values. At other times society will more greatly revere the privacy concerns. While this ad hoc balancing approach lacks the certainties of
bright line rulemaking, it may be the best method for adjudicating society's privacy/disclosure conflicts. The ad hoc method allows society to
be dynamic and flexible as its needs change through time. The privacy/
disclosure conflict is norm driven, and norms are fluid because they are
derived from society's shared values. Society's values in privacy and disclosure may change, making a flexible analytical model requisite.
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